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where the identity of the leaker is not revealed. This information is typically leaked to journalists or 
activists who may be able to seek redress. Leaking is an alternative to whistleblowing and carries fewer 
risks of reprisals but leakers need to be alert to pitfalls with this practice. 
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Civic-minded people who encounter what they believe to be corrupt and illegal 
conduct in the workplace may take it upon themselves to release relevant 
confidential information. This is done either through an open disclosure, 
where the identity of the whistleblower is publicly known, or an unauthorised 
disclosure where the identity of the leaker is not revealed. This information is 
typically leaked to journalists or activists who may be able to seek redress. 
Leaking is an alternative to whistleblowing and carries fewer risks of reprisals 




       
Introduction 
In a democracy people need access to information on political, social and 
economic issues in order to judge whether their elected officials are acting in 
the public interest. However, too often their elected officials evade such 
scrutiny and fraud and abuse goes unchecked. Most people with access to 
relevant information are deterred from leaking or whistleblowing due to 
legislative prohibitions. They may be those embodied in official secrets acts or 
the case of the United States the Espionage Act (1917). The Official Secrets Act 
covers legislation providing for the protection of state secrets and official 
information and is used in the United Kingdom, India, Ireland and Malaysia. 
Australia does not have an Official Secrets Act but has provisions under Part 
VII of the Crimes Act (1914) restricting Commonwealth public servants from 
revealing confidential information. The U.S. Espionage Act has a more limited 
application. This Act only applies to the prohibition on the disclosure of 
government information on defence issues. While governments have aimed to 
keep official secrets confidential public servants with access to this material 
have been successful in releasing it to the public either through the press or in 
recent times passing it to WikiLeaks, a website for newsworthy leaks.  
 
To draw a distinction between whistleblowing and leaking, whistleblowers are 
overt in their disclosure of organisational deviance, but there is a price. 
Bureaucracies now know where their opposition is coming from, and can 
isolate the whistleblowers by discrediting them, not giving them access to 
further information and suspending them from work. Generally leakers don’t 
suffer these reprisals.  
 
The definition of leaking is blurred; it can mean an unauthorised source giving 
information to a journalist but it can also involve an authorised source with 
political power and high status using the media to their advantage with little 
likelihood of being prosecuted (Tiffen 1989: 97). In both instances leakers are 
covert in their disclosure of information. The types of leaker discussed in this 
article are workers in the public sector who without authorisation convey 
       
official information to recipients outside of government (Standing Committee 
67). It is usually released to the media in the public interest and these leakers 
lack positions of high status and power. The information they provide 
journalists has not been processed by official channels and there is an 
undertaking by the journalist that the identity of the source will not be 
revealed. This practice provides some measure of protection to the leaker. 
Journalists are the usual recipients of leaked information but on occasion 
information is leaked to activists who can act as a spur to additional media 
coverage of the story (Martin 2009 206-216). There can be a range of motives 
for leaking not all of them altruistic. Some leaks are vexatious in nature and 
not in the public interest. The protection for journalists lies in checking the 
information with many sources and gauging their reliability (Flynn 2006 264-
265). 
 
The examples of leaking discussed in this paper are mainly Australian ones 
but the issue is applicable to many other countries. Leaks can come from a 
range of organisations; they may be governments, not-for-profit groups, 
corporations, environmental groups, trade unions as well as churches. This 
paper also mainly focuses on leaks from governments. 
Not surprisingly governments and unions will not protect leakers if they are 
caught even when they are acting in the public interest. But there are 
divergent meanings of the phrase ‘the public interest’. Journalists and leakers 
define it as information that brings accountability and transparency to 
government and exposes maladministration or corruption. Governments 
argue that they are the interpreters of the public interest and that public 
servants are be bound by rules of confidentiality and are not free to speak out 
on malfeasance. As Peter Shergold, Secretary of the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet in the Australian government explained, leaking by 
public servants is ‘not just a criminal offence but also democratic sabotage’ 
(Shergold 2004). Supporting this view the then National Secretary of the 
Community and Public Sector Union, Stephen Jones, giving evidence to the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
       
Affairs in its report on whistleblowing protection, held that leaking should not 
be protected due to its harmful impact on the relationship between the 
executive and the public service. Presenting a different perspective to this 
committee was Peter Bennett, president of Whistleblowers Australia. He 
argued that the official responses to people who leak confidential information 
are outrageous and that leakers should be protected from civil and criminal 
liability (Standing Committee 2009 67).  
The practice of leaking 
One of the difficulties for a public servant who sees evidence of what they 
perceive is an organisation’s corrupt practice and believes that neither 
management nor parliament will do anything about the problem, is deciding 
what to do next. They may be influenced by the rhetoric of senior bureaucrats 
who assert that leaking undermines the trust between the executive and the 
public service. This might seem a compelling argument except it hides the 
need for information to be freely available so there is effective decision-
making.  
 
• If a leaker decides to speak to a journalist, they must first decide which 
media outlet is most suitable for publicising the story, whether it is a 
national or local outlet and what the outlet’s editorial policy on the issue is. 
In selecting a reporter it is recommended to approach one who is 
experienced and has a reputation for maintaining confidentiality. 
• Leakers need to understand the importance of the timing of the release of 
documents.  
• A leaker needs to be armed with documents in order to be believed by a 
journalist, unless he or she is an experienced and reliable source.  
• In addition knowledgeable leakers advise briefing the journalist with a 
clear and compelling one page summary of the key issues of the case. 
• The biggest problem with passing documents across to the media is that 
photocopiers tend to leave a signature on the copied document, which 
could be dust or the electronic idiosyncrasies of the machine. So the best 
       
way to photocopy the document/s is to use a photocopier in an offsite 
facility, for example, in a newsagency, library or internet cafe.  When the 
journalist receives the document request him or her to re-photocopy the 
document and shred the document they had received (which is not the 
original). It is best to avoid using departmental photocopiers, fax 
machines, computers, email or telephones (The Art of Anonymous 
Activism 2002). 
• The print media are preferable to television as print is better able to ensure 
the leaker’s anonymity. Television productions quite often need shadow 
outs or use distorted voice – and the original voice sometimes can be 
reconstructed. Television and radio will often do stories inspired by a print 
story.  
• Some leakers, including WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, believe that 
leaking is best undertaken by one person working alone who maintains 
confidentiality.  Again others derive safety from working in a group, with 
information being streamed through a designated spokesperson. In this 
way the journalist knows the identity of only one of the leakers. Others 
believe that with group involvement the security of the operation is 
compromised as someone in the group may drop their guard and talk 
openly about the leaked information.  
• Leaking is unpopular with managers for it is embarrassing and can 
highlight workplace incompetence, inefficiency and secrecy. The leaker is 
left in a strong position as his or her identity is hard to uncover and they 
may be able to stay in the job and leak further information at some stage in 
the future.  
• Reactions by staff members to leaks can be to find the source of the leak 
and pass further additional information to this source so it gets into the 
public arena. 
• If leakers are caught it can result in the same reprisals that whistleblowers 
are subject to – demotion or loss of employment and in fact, to find the 
leakers, managers may resort to targeting innocent people and attributing 
       
them with the leak. This can have the desired effect of making the leaker 
come forward with an admission of guilt. 
• There are risks in leaking. The identity of the leaker may be disclosed 
during the course of a parliamentary inquiry or by accidental disclosure, 
for example when a document is passed to a journalist by fax machine.  
• On the positive side leaking can influence government policy because it can 
result in some aspects of public policy being examined more thoroughly 
than they would in an environment where policy is not subject to such 
scrutiny (Flynn 2006).  
• Further information on methods of leaking can be found in Nicky Hager 
and Bob Burton’s book Secrets and Lies (Hager & Burton 1999), a booklet 
The Art of Anonymous Activism (2002) and Julian Assange’s article, How 
a Whistleblower Should Leak Information (Assange 2010). 
 
Case study - Medibank 
There are many instances where principled public servants have come forward 
to disclose waste and fraud but one that I am familiar with concerns Medibank 
– the precursor to Medicare – where whistleblowers and leakers disclosed 
information to the media, and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) 
of fraud and abuse against Medibank.   
 
Medibank was a system of publically funded universal health care that was 
introduced in Australia in 1975. It enjoyed great electoral popularity but there 
was a defect with the scheme. It had no legislative architecture to control 
fraud and overservicing, and with few systems in place and inadequate 
staffing, the Department of Health was left to manage the situation as best it 
could.  
 
Medibank’s first fraud investigator and first whisleblower was Joe Shaw.  In 
1978 he estimated $100m was being lost to fraud and overservicing and wrote 
a report outlining his concerns. He was not listened to and he resigned. Some 
months later, he gave it to a journalist working for Brisbane’s Courier Mail 
       
newspaper. The article was a page one story. Two days later Senator Mal 
Colston asked that Shaw’s report be tabled in parliament. This request was 
refused. Four years later, committee members of the JCPA recognised the 
value of Shaw’s report. This made it more difficult for senior management in 
the Department of Health to deny knowledge of the problem. 
 
The second whistleblower was John Kelly, Director of the Operations Branch 
of the Commonwealth Department of Health. He had been asked by a senior 
officer of the Department of Health to provide a departmental briefing for the 
Minister. Kelly’s estimate of the amount lost through leakage to the system 
was the same as Joe Shaw’s estimate. Kelly was aware that this information 
was likely to be deleted by senior management, so using a strategy that was 
procedurally correct; he hid the estimate in a complicated statistical appendix 
in an attachment to the brief to the Minister. A senior officer in the 
Department of Health reading Kelly’s report did not grasp the significance of 
the statistical data and the report was forwarded to the Minister.  This figure 
was then sent to the Australian Medical Association (AMA) who accepted the 
figure as the amount lost through fraud and overservicing. 
 
It was to be the actions of whistleblowers, leakers, the media, the AMA and the 
Auditor-General’s office in 1981 that led the JCPA to undertake an inquiry into 
abuse of the Medical Benefits Schedule by medical practitioners. 
 
A freelance journalist, Katherine Beauchamp, was employed by the JCPA from 
February to September 1982 to prepare questions for the committee. She 
interviewed whistleblowers, unauthorized confidential sources and high 
ranking officials. However, her use of material from leakers raised the ire of 
the Committee and she was suspended from her employment. 
 
The Chairman of the Committee, David Connolly, had received leaked 
information that either the Victorian division of the Commonwealth 
Department of Health, or individual staff members of that office, had 
facilitated criminal fraud by some doctors (JCPA Report 203, 1982 48). 
       
Connolly subpoenaed forty-one files from the Commonwealth Department of 
Health’s Melbourne office relating to this matter. On the first day of the 
Committee’s hearings it was announced that there would be no discussion of 
the forty-one files (JCPA vol. 1, 1 July 1982 303) as the citing of the names of 
doctors could prejudice police investigation of the trials of those mentioned in 
the files. 
 
A confidential unauthorised source leaked the police report of the files to 
Michael Smith, an investigative journalist with Melbourne’s The Age 
newspaper, who wrote the story under the headline ‘Medifraud Cover-Up 
Suspected’. On 13 September 1982 there were further revelations. The story 
‘Medifraud: A Tale of Political Failure’ was compiled from leaked government 
documents and other sources and helped put pressure on the government to 
complete an interim report earlier than expected. Its publication in December 
1982 contained forty-five recommendations and it validated the stance taken 
by whistleblowers and leakers for government action on medical fraud and 
overservicing.  
 
In this case study the leaker/s were successful in passing over information to 
the media in ways that protected their anonymity. Whoever the culprit/s were 
they were not caught, discredited or suspended from work. They were able to 
maintain the secrecy of their covert manoeuvre to get information to the 
media and bypass official channels. The leaker/s took documentary evidence 
to an experienced journalist who investigated the claims of the leaker/s, 
collected further evidence and wrote newspaper articles on the topic. The 
timing of the release of the documents was fortuitous. The editor of the 
newspaper was interested in white collar crime, the health debate and exposés 
of policy failures of the Fraser government. This was a government already 
weakened by scandals and leakers and whistleblowers were emboldened to 
make disclosures that would be effective (Flynn 2004 218).  
 
The bigger picture  
       
Leakers and whistleblowers acted in concert and fought for media and 
parliamentary oversight of fraud and abuse against Medibank. These acts 
come under the umbrella of what political theorist, John Keane, called 
‘monitory democracy’. This was a new form of democracy born in the post 
world war two period which saw the emergence of communicative 
technologies – the photocopier, the scanner, the fax machine and later the 
Internet, mobile phones and video recorders. It enabled citizens to more 
effectively monitor the actions of government and with the help of the media 
tell others about matters that have been covered up (Keane 2009). Peter 
Shergold’s admonition that leaking was ‘democratic sabotage’ is at odds with 
monitory democracy: the corrective to unnecessary secrecy and unaccountable 
power.  
One influential monitor on democracy was Daniel Ellsberg, an employee of the 
Rand Corporation and an advisor to the Pentagon in the 1960s. Initially he 
was a supporter of the war in Vietnam but in the course of his employment he 
uncovered evidence that the Johnson administration had lied about its 
involvement in the war. Ellsberg decided to take action. He photocopied the 
evidence of the government’s deception, a hefty 7,000 page set of documents 
called the Pentagon Papers and leaked this information to The New York 
Times in 1971 (Ellsberg 2002). There were long legal delays before the Times 
started to publish the documents. The government issued injunctions to 
prevent publication of any other papers in the series. The matter ended up in 
the Supreme Court which ruled against the injunctions and this generated 
adverse publicity for the government.  
When asked whether he would have used this approach today Ellsberg replied 
that to avoid the legal delays he would have scanned the documents onto the 
Internet. Julian Assange, argued that for someone in Ellsberg’s position it 
would be better to go to a mainstream outlet to get maximum publicity but use 
WikiLeaks for the storage of the documents. This has the advantage, Assange 
told The New York Times, that the material can be verified in the same way 
that an academic paper can be verified.  
       
 
 
Learning more  
Much has changed since the inception of newspaper investigative journalism. 
In 2006 WikiLeaks was developed as a safe house for newsworthy leaks which 
are of political, historic or ethical significance. The site is located on servers in 
Sweden, Belgium and the United States. It maintains its own servers, keeps no 
logs and uses military grade encryption to protect sources and other 
confidential information. To date they have not released a misattributed 
document. 
The website has had significant successes. These include the release of the 
Afghan War Logs, the Iraqi War Logs and US embassy diplomatic cables. The 
mainstream media picked up these stories on WikiLeaks and the level of 
publicity, which ensued, encouraged other leaking activists to send material to 
this site. The retaliatory action taken by the US government was to imprison 
the alleged leaker Bradley Manning.  
Most unauthorised leakers do not meet such a fate. In fact they are successful 
in reaching their goals. They may be to get information via the media into the 
public arena, or to expose government policy to wider and more rigorous 
community debate. Some want to drive a wedge between the executive and the 
parliament by setting a doubt in the mind of politicians that they are not being 
well briefed by senior officers of their departments through the omission or 
cover-up of information. For others it is to achieve more substantial social or 
political reform than any parliamentary inquiry can achieve.  
 
Julian Assange has a different agenda and a bolder ambition. He is more 
interested in societies being based on justice rather than on transparency and 
openness, although these goals can converge. In essays written in 2006 he 
explained his position. The goal is to “radically shift regime behaviour”. He 
argued,  
       
“We must understand the key generative structure of bad governance...we 
must use these insights to inspire within us and others a course of 
ennobling and effective action to replace the structures that lead to bad 
governance with something better” (Assange 2006a). 
 
He likens this bad governance to a conspiracy and by that he means the ability 
of political elites to hold onto power through the secrecy of their plans and 
actions which work to the detriment of the population. Conspiracies can be 
undone by mass leaking. The idea is to increase the porousness of the 
conspiracy’s information system so that the conspiracy will turn against itself 
in self-defence. As the lines of communication are interrupted the information 
flow decreases to the point where the conspiracy is not able to govern. 
Where this bold ambition leads is yet to be seen but in the meantime whether 
it is on WikiLeaks or in mainstream journalism leaking provides an alternative 
to whistleblowing or just doing nothing in the face of corruption, fraud, waste, 
abuse or hazards to the public. Leakers can be effective in redressing these 
injustices but they need to be mindful of the precautions to be taken to protect 
their anonymity.  
I wish to thank Jørgen Johansen, Liam Phelan, Brian Martin, William de 
Maria, Sandrine Therese, Lyn Carson, Colin Salter, Sharon Callaghan and Ian 
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